The problems with assessing corporate IT and Operational Technology separately in a Critical Utilities provider

The increasing convergence of Information Technology (IT) and Operational Technology (OT) is not without its challenges. IT and OT differ in their primary functions and in the nature of the systems they manage.

Operational Technology refers to the hardware and software that monitors and controls physical processes. OT is deeply embedded in the day-to-day functionality of critical infrastructure, managing tasks like supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA), process control, and industrial automation.

Information Technology involves data assets and focuses more on the management of computer systems, networks, and software. IT systems support business operations, administrative functions, and decision-making processes, whilst OT is primarily concerned with the physical world.

Whilst standard thinking sets IT and OT environments apart, assessing them separately in a critical utilities provider creates six significant risks and operational challenges.

1. Overlooked interdependencies and attack paths

Modern utilities increasingly integrate IT and OT systems for efficiency and real-time monitoring, blurring traditional boundaries.

Separate assessments can miss vulnerabilities at the IT/OT interface, such as insecure connections or data flows, which attackers can exploit to pivot from IT to OT or vice versa.

2. Incomplete risk visibility

Assessing IT and OT in isolation creates silos, leading to blind spots in the organization's overall risk posture.

Threats that traverse both environments — such as ransomware entering via IT and disrupting OT — may go undetected until significant damage occurs.

3. Inconsistent security controls and investment prioritisation

IT and OT have different security priorities: IT focuses on confidentiality and data integrity, while OT prioritises availability and real-time operations.

Separate assessments can result in inconsistent controls or gaps where neither side fully addresses risks at the convergence points.

4. Increased attack surface

The convergence of IT and OT expands the attack surface where vulnerabilities in one domain can be leveraged to compromise the other.

Without a unified assessment, organisations may underestimate the true extent of their combined risk exposure.

5. Regulatory and compliance gaps

Critical utilities are subject to regulations that increasingly require a holistic, risk-based approach to cyber security across both IT and OT.

Separate assessments may lead to non-compliance or failure to meet sector-specific standards that mandate integrated risk management. Joined up thinking may be the real regulatory requirement.

6. Operational inefficiencies and poor incident response

Lack of coordination between IT and OT teams can slow down response to incidents that affect both domains, increasing downtime and the impact on essential services.

Undertaking disconnected security assessments hinder the development of unified incident response and recovery plans offering both teams a chance to work in a unified way.

Assessing IT and OT separately in critical utilities providers may undermine cyber resilience by missing interdependencies, creating blind spots and leaving the organization vulnerable to sophisticated attacks that exploit the convergence of these environments. An integrated, holistic approach is essential for effective risk management (and potentially regulatory compliance).

‍